The corporate managers and stockholders relationship: the moral hazard issue, case of Moroccan listed companies

This paper deals with the moral hazard problem associated with the behavior of corporate managers. The stockholders (shareholders) cannot control ex ante the managers, because the latter’s action is unobservable to the former, and the stockholders cannot oblige the managers to choose an action which is effective and benefit both parties. The stockholders may not modify the impact of action taken by managers if and only if they decide to condition the action payment to the final observable income. In the specific context of emerging markets listed companies in where the level of opacity and the inefficiency to monitor are very high, the revelation principle does not play correctly. Therefore, it is not interesting to the Agent to show his true type. In this Paper we will specifically deal with this type of problem within the framework of companies listed in the Casablanca Stock Exchange. Our approach consists to show the moral hazard issue existing between two parties: the stockholders (i.e., uninformed “Principal”) and the manager namely the Chief Executive Officer (i.e., informed “Agent”).Asymmetrical Information; Moral Hazard; Non-fulfilment of Contract; Governance of Listed Companies; Collusion; Cooperative Game; Stockholders; Corporate Managers; Casablanca Stock Exchange.

The Predictive Power of Conditional Models: What Lessons to Draw with Financial Crisis in the Case of Pre-Emerging Capital Markets?

The uncertainty plays a central role in most of the problems which addressed by the modern financial theory. For some time, we know that the uncertainty under the speculative price varies over the time. However, it is only recently that a lot of studies in applied finance and monetary economics using the explicit modelling of time series involving the second and the higher moments of variables. Indeed, the first tool appeared in order to model such variables has been introduced by Engel (1982). This is the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity and its many extensions. Thus, with the emergence and development of these models, Value-at-Risk, which plays a major role in assessment and risk management of financial institutions, has become a more effective tool to measure the risk of asset holdings. Following the current financial debacle, we give the simple question about the progress and some achievements made in the context of emerging and pre-emergent financial markets microstructure which can sustain and limit the future fluctuations. Today, we know that the crisis has no spared any financial market in the world. The magnitude and damage of the crisis effects vary in the space and time. In the Moroccan stock market context, it was found that the effects were not so harmful and that the future of these markets faces a compromise or at least a long lethargy. Indeed, inspired by these events, our study attempts to undertake two exercises. In first, we are testing the ability of the nonlinear ARCH and GARCH models (EGARCH, TGARCH, GJR-GARCH, QGARCH) to meet the number of expected exceedances (shortfalls) of VaR measurement. In second, we are providing a forecasting volatility under the time-varying of VaR.Market Microstructure, ARCH Models, VaR, Time-Varying Volatility, Forecasting Volatility, Casablanca Stock Exchange.

Employment contract and insecurity jobs: asymmetric information modelling of atypical situation, case of poor and less developed countries

Our aim in this paper is dedicated to study the relations of recruiting among the employee and the employer in a frame characterized by the insecurity conditions of job and large scale of unemployment. The recruiting relationship that we will study is atypical as far as the offered salary is not a fixed minimum wage. The hiring contract between the employer and the employee in the developing labour markets is made with different conditions regarding to others, mainly in the developed countries. In these countries, the hiring signature of contract is linked to some preconditions like as the regularization statutory of hiring, the minimum of job security, wage and working rights in the case of unfair dismissal. In these conditions and under high level of costs which are engaged by the employer in order to research the skilled work even to pay the various payroll charges, the Principal has been faced with asymmetric information problem concerning the adverse selection linked to the nature of Agent type (informative characteristic of the employee): is it the check or the bad Agent type? In order to reduce this informative asymmetry, the Principal offers the various recruiting contracts with various pecuniary motivations. The mechanism of game can be a direct mechanism designer where the optimal strategy of the Agent is to announce its true type (it’s a situation where is benefit for the Agent to make sincere announcements) in order to maximize his expected utility. This standard modelling of Principal/Agent theory is not adapted with the labour markets situation in the case of poor and less developed countries. In the case of labour markets where the hiring conditions are much unsecured, we note that the Incentive Compatibility and the Individual Rationality of Agent do not exist. In fact, we are facing a problem in which there is a sort of indecision of reserved salary which allows the Agent to know if it is relatively well paid or not. Our aim in this article is to try to find an adequate modelling in the case of developing labour markets situation under the frame of Principal/Agent theory.Moroccan Labour Market; Insecure Jobs; Adverse Selection; Principal/Agent Theory; Poor and Developing Countries.

INFORMATION asymmetries and microcredit: The Moroccan case

In this paper we apply the Principal/Agent theory in case of microcredit granted to the Moroccan micro-companies. The practice reveals us that a part of the receipted credits is diverted from its initial objective. Indeed, a situation of information asymmetries linked with adverse selection and moral hazard can be noticed. Given that the Agent behavior (the debtor) is unobservable, the Principal (the Creditor) cannot select every time the good types of Agents.Microfinance; Microcredit Institutions; Moroccan Micro-companies; Adverse Selection; Moral Hazard; Principal/Agent Theory; Information Asymmetries.

The corporate managers and stockholders relationship: the moral hazard issue, case of Moroccan listed companies

This paper deals with the moral hazard problem associated with the behavior of corporate managers. The stockholders (shareholders) cannot control ex ante the managers, because the latter’s action is unobservable to the former, and the stockholders cannot oblige the managers to choose an action which is effective and benefit both parties. The stockholders may not modify the impact of action taken by managers if and only if they decide to condition the action payment to the final observable income. In the specific context of emerging markets listed companies in where the level of opacity and the inefficiency to monitor are very high, the revelation principle does not play correctly. Therefore, it is not interesting to the Agent to show his true type. In this Paper we will specifically deal with this type of problem within the framework of companies listed in the Casablanca Stock Exchange. Our approach consists to show the moral hazard issue existing between two parties: the stockholders (i.e., uninformed “Principal”) and the manager namely the Chief Executive Officer (i.e., informed “Agent”)

The corporate managers and stockholders relationship: the moral hazard issue, case of Moroccan listed companies

This paper deals with the moral hazard problem associated with the behavior of corporate managers. The stockholders (shareholders) cannot control ex ante the managers, because the latter’s action is unobservable to the former, and the stockholders cannot oblige the managers to choose an action which is effective and benefit both parties. The stockholders may not modify the impact of action taken by managers if and only if they decide to condition the action payment to the final observable income. In the specific context of emerging markets listed companies in where the level of opacity and the inefficiency to monitor are very high, the revelation principle does not play correctly. Therefore, it is not interesting to the Agent to show his true type. In this Paper we will specifically deal with this type of problem within the framework of companies listed in the Casablanca Stock Exchange. Our approach consists to show the moral hazard issue existing between two parties: the stockholders (i.e., uninformed “Principal”) and the manager namely the Chief Executive Officer (i.e., informed “Agent”)

Contrat de travail et précarisation : une modélisation de l’information asymétrique d’une situation atypique, cas des pays pauvres et en développement

Our aim in this paper is dedicated to study the relations of recruiting among the employee and the employer in a frame characterized by the insecurity conditions of job and large scale of unemployment. The recruiting relationship that we will study is atypical as far as the offered salary is not a fixed minimum wage. The hiring contract between the employer and the employee in the developing labour markets is made with different conditions regarding to others, mainly in the developed countries. In these countries, the hiring signature of contract is linked to some preconditions like as the regularization statutory of hiring, the minimum of job security, wage and working rights in the case of unfair dismissal. In these conditions and under high level of costs which are engaged by the employer in order to research the skilled work even to pay the various payroll charges, the Principal has been faced with asymmetric information problem concerning the adverse selection linked to the nature of Agent type (informative characteristic of the employee): is it the check or the bad Agent type? In order to reduce this informative asymmetry, the Principal offers the various recruiting contracts with various pecuniary motivations. The mechanism of game can be a direct mechanism designer where the optimal strategy of the Agent is to announce its true type (it’s a situation where is benefit for the Agent to make sincere announcements) in order to maximize his expected utility. This standard modelling of Principal/Agent theory is not adapted with the labour markets situation in the case of poor and less developed countries. In the case of labour markets where the hiring conditions are much unsecured, we note that the Incentive Compatibility and the Individual Rationality of Agent do not exist. In fact, we are facing a problem in which there is a sort of indecision of reserved salary which allows the Agent to know if it is relatively well paid or not. Our aim in this article is to try to find an adequate modelling in the case of developing labour markets situation under the frame of Principal/Agent theory

EXCHANGE RATE PASS-THROUGH IN MOROCCO: A STRUCTURAL VAR APPROACH

This study analyzes the impact of short- and long-term exchange rate fluctuations in Morocco. The purpose of this paper is to study the shocks transmission of exchange rates variations to prices index known as exchange rate pass-through. The empirical results of the quarterly data between 2000 and 2018 revealed that the pass-through of the exchange rate in Morocco is quite important, but incomplete and delayed in three categories of price index: consumer price index, Imports price Index and Industrial production price Index. JEL: G15, G17, C51, C52 Article visualizations

La modélisation du taux de change USD/MAD : Quel modèle économétrique adaptable pour la prévision ?

L’article essaye de modéliser le taux de change USD/MAD à travers un modèleéconométrique permettant de donner des valeurs-futures des cours de change du Dirhamcontre le dollar sur les trois mois à venir, nous essayerons de donner au terme de ce travail lesvaleurs prévisibles en se basant sur le modèle généré par l’étude, ces valeurs couvrent lapériode qui commence à partir du 20/04/2019 jusqu’au 18/07/2019, notre étude a montréque la série est caractérisée par le phénomène de volatilité, par des spécificationsasymétriques et l’existence d’une kurtosis excessive. Nous avons effectué un test ARCHqui a rejeté l’hypothèse nulle d’homoscédasticité, nous avons donc déduis qu’un modèleARMA non linéaire de type ARCH est adéquat, ensuite nous avons estimé quatreextensions du modèle ARCH susceptibles d’être les modèles de la prévision.Le critère d’AIC (AKAIKE INFORMATION CRTIERIUM), nous amène à choisir lemodèle GJR GARCH comme modèle adéquat pour la prévision.Mots clés : volatilité; modélisation; politique de change; prévision; séries temporelle